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RALF MICHAELS

A. T HE P UBLICISATION

OF

P RIVATE I NTERNATIONAL L AW ?

The relationship between public and private international law, the issue of the
excellent book under review,1 has often been addressed. But the question is ever
new because it is asked under ever-changing circumstances. First, circumstances
differ between countries. In the United States, there has long been a tendency
towards unifying public international law and (international) choice of law
(which is, tellingly, dealt with in the Restatement for Foreign Relations).2 In
England, the separation of private and public international law has remained
much more stable, at least until recently.3 Second, such circumstances change
over time,4 between, say, the 19th century when a separation seemed appropriate5 and the 20th century when some jurisdictions experienced a greater influence of public on private international law.6 The current age of globalisation
seems to put all such distinctions into question.7 Recently, there seems to be a
*
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S Leible and M Ruffert (eds), Völkerrecht und IPR (Jena, Jenaer Wissenschaftliche Verlagsgesellschaft, 2006).
Restatement of the Law (3d), The Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1987), §§ 402–16.
Mathias Reimann has asked that a potential new restatement of conflict of laws account for
international choice of law: “A New Restatement for the International Age” (2000) 75 Indiana
Law Journal 575. See also Academic Workshop: Should We Continue to Distinguish between
Public and Private Law? (1985) 79 ASIL Proceedings 352
A Mills, “The Private History of International Law” (2006) 55 International and Comparative Law
Quarterly 1.
A Nussbaum, “The Rise and Decline of the Law-of-Nations Doctrine in the Conflict of Laws”
(1942) 52 Columbia Law Review 189.
Eg R Phillimore, Commentaries upon International Law (1854) 54; J Westlake, A Treatise on Private International Law of Conflict of Laws (1859) 18. More recently for strict distinction, see R Jennings and
A Watts (eds), Oppenheim’s International Law (London, Longman, 9th edn, 1996), 6–7; MN Shaw,
International Law (Cambridge University Press, 5th edn, 2003).
PM Brown, “Private versus Public International Law” (1942) 36 American Journal of International
Law 448; JR Stevenson, “The Relationship of Private International Law to Public International
Law” (1952) 52 Columbia Law Review 561, 564; G Schwarzenberger, A Manual of International Law
(London, Institute of World Affairs, 5th edn, 1967) 4; JR Paul, The Isolation of Private International
Law (1989) 7 Wisconsin International Law Journal 149.
Literature on this has no boundaries. See the references in R Michaels, “Welche Globalisierung
für das Recht? Welches Recht für die Globalisierung?” (2005) 69 RabelsZ 525; R Michaels and
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tendency towards merging the two fields – either under an expanded understanding of public international law (sometimes under the name of transnational
law or process),8 or as a publicisation of private international law.9 At least, so it
is argued, the relevance of public international law and the international order
for private international law needs to be highlighted more.10
This alleged tendency towards a merger, and towards prioritising public over
private international law, emerges mostly from an expansion of public international law. Traditional public international law (at least since the 19th century)
dealt with relations between countries and left the role of private actors to
private international law. Now that multinational corporations and individuals
have come into the focus of public international law, this distinction has become
less clear.11 Traditional public international law focused very much on international politics and left economic matters largely to private international law;
today, international economic law has become a central feature of public international law. Traditional public international law was strictly international and
therefore distinct from domestic private international law. Today, public international law is becoming domesticated,12 and several different domestic variants
of public international law emerge, as diverging views between the US Supreme
Court and the German Constitutional Court regarding the impact of the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations show quite clearly.13 Traditional
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N Jansen, “Private Law Beyond the State? Europeanization, Globalization, Privatization” (2006)
54 American Journal of Comparative Law 843; N Jansen and R Michaels, “Private Law and the State
– Comparative Perceptions and Historical Dimensions” (2007) 71 RabelsZ 345, all with extensive
further references. More recently, see E Leibfried et al (eds), Transforming the Golden-Age Nation State
(Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).
Eg PC Jessup, Transnational Law (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1956); Paul, supra n 6, 158–9;
HH Koh, “Transnational Legal Process” (1996) 75 Nebraska Law Review 181; for a summary and
evaluation of the debate, see P Zumbansen, “Transnational Law”, in J Smits (ed), Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2006), 738.
H Muir Watt, “Droit public et droit privé dans les rapports internationaux (Vers la publicisation
des conflits de lois?)” (1997) 41 Archives de philosophie du droit – le privé et le public 207; PS Berman,
“From International Law to Law and Globalization” (2005) 43 Columbia Journal of Transnational
Law 485 518–23.
Mills, supra n 3.
Eg A Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (Oxford University Press, 2006); O
Dörr, “Privatisierung’ des Völkerrechts” (2005) 60 Juristenzeitung 905; T Meron, The Humanization
of International Law (Leiden, Nijhoff, 2006).
A-M Slaughter and W Burke-White, “The Future of International Law is Domestic (or The
European Way of Law)” (2006) 47 Harvard International Law Journal 327.
Sanchez-Llamas v Oregon, 548 US 331 (US S Ct 2006); Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG –
German Federal Constitutional Court), 19 Sep 2006, 2 BvR 2115/01, International Law in
Domestic Courts (ILDC) 668 (DE 2006). For comparison, see J Gogolin, “Avena and SanchezLlamas Come to Germany – The German Constitutional Court Upholds Rights under the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations” (2007) 8 German Law Journal 261, http://www.
germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=805; KF Gräditz, “German Federal Constitutional
Court: Decision on Failure to Provide Consular Notification” (2007) 101 American Journal of International Law 627; C Hoppe, “Implementation of LaGrand and Avena in Germany and the
United States: Exploring a Transatlantic Divide in Search of a Uniform Interpretation of
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public international law relied to a large extent on open concepts and on subtle
and case-specific balancing of interests instead of formal and technical rules.
Today’s public international law rests more and more on technical language
traditionally reserved to private international law.
Yet even if public international law is expanding, this expansion comes at the
expense not of private international law but of the specific public character of
public international law.14 Privatisation and the growing importance of private
actors present a challenge to public international law. By contrast, we should
expect a boost for private international law.
This makes it attractive to look to a country in which the distinction between
private and public international law is still quite intact: Germany. Although
almost all German academics today have been exposed to foreign experience
and many have pursued higher-level academic studies in other countries (most
frequently the United States or England), theirs remains, mostly, a specifically
German perspective. This perspective is especially interesting because, as Klaus
Schurig makes clear in this book,15 the distinction between private and public
law, considered passé in many other systems, is still central to German legal
thought.16 That distinction exists not only in domestic law, but also in international law. Public and private international law are strictly separate disciplines;
the last German professor officially entitled to teach both and having published
widely in both (at least according to the introduction to the book under review),17
Wilhelm Wengler (whose estate subsidised the conference leading to the book
under review), passed away more than ten years ago.18 Public and private voices
are brought together rarely, except under the aegis of the German Society of
International Law,19 which produces annually a book in which public and private
international lawyers address the same issues from the perspectives of their
respective disciplines.20

Consular Rights” (2007) 18 European Journal of International Law 317. The latest US Supreme
Court decision on these questions is Medellín v Texas (25 Mar 2008), (2008) 76 United States Law
Week 4143.
14

15
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20

RG Steinhardt, “The Privatization of Public Law” (1991) 25 George Washington Journal of International Law and Economics 523, 544. B Kingsbury, “The Problem of the Public in International
Law” (NYU Law School, working paper, 2005).
K Schurig, “Völkerrecht und IPR: Methodische Verschleifung oder strukturierte Interaktion?”, in
Leible and Ruffert, supra n 1, 55, 56–7.
See Jansen and Michaels, supra n 7.
Burkhard Hess at Tübingen reportedly also holds a venia in public and private international law.
On Wengler, see S Leible and M Ruffert, “Einführung”, in Leible and Ruffert, supra n 1, 17,
19–20 with further references in n 14; for a brief obituary, see also C Dominicé (Secretary
General’s report), (1996) 66 II Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit International 52.
“Deutsche Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht”, not to be confused with the “Deutsche Vereinigung für
Internationales Recht”, the German branch of the International Law Association (ILA).
Berichte der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht; for a list, see http://www.dgvr.de/
berichte.pdf.
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This excellent new collection of essays deserves attention, because it brings
this specifically German dual perspective to the issues at stake. Edited by a
private international lawyer (Stefan Leible) and a public international lawyer
(Matthias Ruffert), it assembles a great portion of the leading German authorities on public and private international law, respectively. The editors wisely
assigned several topics to one private and one public international law expert.
Comparison of the respective disciplinary views reveals stark differences;21 the
combination shows that any assumed amalgam of public and private international law would internally still be quite heterogeneous. At the same time,
because all authors are German academics, the book provides us with specifically
German views.
The book combines 13 essays on various topics, and not all of them concern
specifically private or public international law. Instead of addressing them in the
order of the book, this review will therefore try to place the German answers
within more general debates on three issues. The first issue concerns the degree
to which public international law determines private international law rules
between states. The second issue is whether the role of the individual, as
expressed especially in human rights, has an impact on private international law.
The third issue, finally, concerns the private/public mix of the global economy.
Are private and public international law merging within international economic
law? How is the distinction between these two legal areas affected by the
increasing role of states as market participants? On the basis of these three
issues, we can address the general question: is private international law being
publicised, or are we observing a return of the private?

B. P UBLIC I NTERNATIONAL L AW D UTIES

TOWARDS

F OREIGN C OUNTRIES

To what extent does public international law determine the content of private
international law? In the United States, although choice of law for international
conflicts is part of the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, the relevant rules
restate US practice on choice of law rather than public international law. In
other countries, there is mostly agreement that public international law places
minimal, if any, restraints on private international law. In this volume, Karl
Heinz Ziegler treats the history, Heinz-Peter Mansel the current state of views.
They show that, at least from a German perspective, the role of traditional
public international law in this regard is very limited; but rules focused on individuals, especially human rights rules, may well become more important.

21

Similarly H-P Mansel, “Staatlichkeit des Internationalen Privatrechts und Völkerrecht”, in Leible
and Ruffert, supra n 1, 89, 91
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1. Customary International Law
Attempts to develop a public international law of allocation of jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction to prescribe, were popular in Germany around the turn of
the 19th century (Zitelmann, Frankenstein) and have more recently been revived
by a public international lawyer (Albert Bleckmann).22 These attempts have been
unsuccessful, as Hans Peter Mansel shows in a very rich study of the relationship
between a domestic understanding of choice of law and public international
law.23 First, there is no common state practice except for the most unproblematic
cases.24 Violations of accepted choice-of-law principles do not yield diplomatic
protests; at best, the resulting decisions are denied recognition.25 Any attempt to
be more specific must therefore be axiomatic, as was indeed the case for
Zitelmann’s theory. Second, such an idea can rarely lead to rules of the necessary specificity.26 At best, it results in the vacuous finding that each state must
have a regime to deal with private international law questions. This finding is
fatal also to the idea of “dédoublement”, presented especially by Scelle, that
domestic rules on private international law are at heart international law norms,
mirrored in domestic law that thereby becomes an executor of public international law.27
The most important restraint arising from customary international law is the
genuine link requirement, established by the International Court of Justice to
justify the exercise of jurisdiction.28 Walter Wheeler Cook showed as early as
1942 that such a criterion rarely leads to meaningful restraints.29 Alexander
Makarov had reached a similar conclusion three years earlier.30 Mansel, in a very
careful and generous analysis, comes largely to the same result, at least for areas
of traditional private law. The criterion is both too broad and too vague to yield
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23
24

25
26
27
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30

E Zitelmann, Internationales Privatrecht (3 vols, Munich, Duncker & Humblot, 1897–1912); E Frankenstein, Internationales Privatrecht (Grenzrecht) (4 vols, Berlin-Grunewald, Dr Walther Rothschild,
1926–35): A Bleckmann, Die völkerrechtlichen Grundlagen des internationalen Kollisionsrechts (Cologne,
Heymanns, 1992). For a French reception, see P de Vareilles-Sommières, La Compétence de l’Etat en
matière de droit privé (Paris, LGDJ, 1997).
Mansel, supra n 21, 89.
Mansel, supra n 21, 111–14; Schurig, supra n 15, 60–1; similarly B Audit, Droit International Privé
(Paris, Economica, 4th edn, 2006), 30–1; C von Bar and P Mankowski, Internationales Privatrecht,
vol 1 (Munich, Beck, 2nd edn, 2003), § 3 nos 8–13.
WE Beckett, “What Is Private International Law?” (1926) 7 British Yearbook of International Law 73.
Mansel supra n 21, 97–103.
See A Cassese, “Remarks on Scelle’s Theory of ‘Role Splitting’ (dédoublement fonctionnel) in
International Law" (1990) 1 European Journal of International Law 210.
Nottebohm case (Liechtenstein v Guatemala), 1955 ICJ Rep 4; see already the case of the SS Lotus (France
v Turkey), 1927 PCIJ (Ser A) No 10.
W Wheeler Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Law (Cambridge, MA, Harvard
University Press, 1942), 71–8, discussing limited practical effect of the Lotus decision of the ICJ.
A Makarov, “Völkerrecht und Internationales Privatrecht”, in Mélanges Streit, vol 1 (Athens 1939),
535, 548–9 and passim. Cf E Jayme, Internationales Privatrecht und Völkerrecht (Heidelberg, Müller,
2003), 18–19.
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private international law rules.31 At best, the criterion results in a multitude of
countries having jurisdiction; it says nothing about the role of private international law in deciding which of these countries’ laws should apply. It is hard to
imagine a rule of private international law using a connecting factor more
ephemeral than what is required by public international law.
2. Comity
The more prominent foundation for the obligation to apply foreign laws has
always been comity.32 Although Dicey famously called it “a singular specimen of
confusion of thought produced by laxity of language”,33 it still plays an important role in Anglo-American conflicts thinking. The US Supreme Court uses it
frequently as its basis for international cases – although comity, enigmatically
defined in a leading decision as “neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the
one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other”,34 provides
hardly any clear guidelines.35 In England, where choice of law is now mostly
based on specific rules, comity plays a limited role as a restriction especially for
service out of the jurisdiction, for anti-suit injunctions and for Mareva injunctions.36
In Germany, a public concept of comity plays hardly any role today, except
perhaps to express a generally friendly attitude towards foreign law.37 Karl-Heinz
Ziegler, in his contribution as a historian of public international law, pleads for a
greater role for comity in private international law.38 However, when he suggests
viewing Savigny’s use of the concept of comity in relation to views on public
31

32

33

34
35

36

37

38
39

40

Mansel, supra n 21, 117–28 cites to two decisions by the German Federal Court of Justice
(Bundesgerichtshof), questioning the genuine link between a state and a corporation incorporated
under that state’s law. Denial of such a link could not be based on international law.
Eg H Yntema, “The Comity Doctrine” (1966) 65 Michigan Law Review 9 with a historical “Foreword” by K Nadelmann, ibid 1; J Paul, “Comity in International Law” (1991) 32 Harvard
International Law Journal 1; J Paul, “The Transformation of International Comity” (2008) 71/3
Law and Contemporary Problems (forthcoming).
AV Dicey, The Conflict of Laws (1st edn, 1896), 10, quoted with approval by HF Goodrich, Handbook of the Conflict of Laws (St Paul, MN, West Publishing, 3rd edn, 1949), 11–12.
Hilton v Guyot, 159 US 113, 163–4 (US S Ct 1895).
See, most recently, L Collins, “The United States Supreme Court and the Principles of Comity:
Evidence in Transnational Litigation” (2006) 8 Yearbook of Private International Law 53.
Derby & Co Ltd v Weldon (Nos 3 and 4) [1990] Ch 65, 82 (CA); Crédit Suisse Fides Trust SA v Cuoghi
[1998] QB 818, 827 (CA) per Millett LJ. See, more generally, L Collins, “Comity in Modern
Private International Law”, in J Fawcett (ed), Reform and Development of Private International Law:
Essays in Honour of Sir Peter North (Oxford University Press, 2002), 89.
See G Kegel and K Schurig, Internationales Privatrecht (Munich, Beck, 9th edn, 2004), 185; KH
Ziegler, “Völkerrechtliche Verpflichtung zur Anwendung oder nur ‘freundliche Beachtung’
fremden Rechts? Die comitas-Lehre heute (Betrachtungen eines Rechtshistorikers)”, in Leible
and Ruffert, supra n 1, 43, 54); Schurig, supra n 15, 60.
Ziegler, ibid.
Ziegler, ibid, 46–7 hints at a possible connection between Savigny’s private international law and
the public international law of his time. For reasons expressed in the text I would not expect this
to be fruitful.
See G Kegel, “Story and Savigny” (1989) 37 American Journal of Comparative Law 39.
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international law of the time,39 he underestimates the fundamental shift in the
nature of the concept as espoused by Joseph Story and by Friedrich Carl von
Savigny.40 Story had defined private international law as a subdiscipline of international law,41 and connections to public international law and/or federalism
were always important in his work. This understanding of comity as concerning
relations between governments established private international law as a discipline of conflicts between different governments, and thereby lent itself nicely to
20th-century conceptions of conflict of laws as conflicts of governmental interests, at heart very much a public law conception of conflict of laws. Savigny, by
contrast, came not from international law but from private law. His treatise on
private international law was written merely as the eighth and final volume of
his magnum opus on Roman (private) law.42 The questions to which Savigny
responds are questions of private law, especially of the reach (over space and
time) of private law rules. Because private law is, in Savigny’s conception,
distinct from the will of any legislator, private international law has little to do
with the mutual respect between sovereigns. Instead, comity signifies, for Savigny,
a “recognized community of different nations”.43 To quote Kegel, “The ‘völkerrechtliche Gemeinschaft’ was not a community of international law, but a legal
community of peoples.’44
This led to a fundamental difference in conception, not only of comity but
also of private international law. The end of private international law for Story
is a situation of mutual respect and harmony between states; for Savigny it is “an
international common law of nations”, a “universal customary law”.45 Story
expects agreement between states over allocation of lawmaking capacity;
Savigny expects a trend towards substantive harmonisation of laws. Story maintains the international law character of private international law; with Savigny,
for the first time, private international law is truly privatised.46 This distinction of
concepts is thus of crucial importance. Many of the differences between US and,
especially, continental private international law can be explained by this decisive
move in the 19th century. More importantly, in an age of decreasing relevance
of the state and increasing attention to private matters, Savigny’s civil society
41
42

43

44

45
46
47

J Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws (3rd edn, 1846), 13.
On the origins of this volume, see F Sturm, “Savigny und das internationale Privatrecht seiner
Zeit” (1979) 8 Ius commune 92.
F von Savigny, A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws, and the Limits of their Operation in Respect of Place and
Time (W Guthrie trans, 1880), 45.
Kegel, supra n 40, 59; see already M Gutzwiller, Der Einfluss Savignys auf die Entwicklung des Internationalprivatrechts (Freiburg [Switzerland], Universitätsverlag Gschwend, Tschopp & Co, 1923),
43–4.
Savigny, supra n 43, 70.
Kegel, supra n 40, 58–9.
For limits to Savigny as a model for globalised conflict of laws, see R Michaels, “Globalising
Savigny? The State in Savigny’s Private International Law and the Challenge from Europeanization and Globalization”, in M Stolleis and W Streeck (eds), Dezentralisierung. Aktuelle Fragen
politischer und rechtlicher Steuerung im Kontext der Globalisierung (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2007), 119.
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concept of comitas gentium may well win the day over the public international law
conception prevalent in Joseph Story’s work.47
3. Choice-of-Law Treaties
With the limited role of general international law and the unclear character of
comity as a public concept, the burden of choice of law could be thought to rest
on treaties, addressed briefly by Heinz-Peter Mansel.48 (Jürgen Basedow’s contribution on treaties concerns mostly substantive private law, not private
international law.49) Beginning with Mancini’s conception of private international law as based on a world of sovereign nations and the adoption of this
idea by the International Law Institute in 1874/75,50 treaties had been viewed as
the best instrument to overcome undesired differences between domestic rules on
private international law.51 Scholars proposed them as a means to achieve
unity;52 the Hague Conference on Private International Law was established to
further the development of such treaties. Underlying such hopes was the
assumption that private international law unification must and can be mediated
via states as treaty parties. This hope has not been fulfilled. What Basedow says
in this book with regard to the unification of substantive private law53 applies
equally well to choice of law: general public international law instruments,
including in particular the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, are inadequate for private international law. Unified choice-of-law rules do not merely
place obligations on states, they unify the law itself. As a consequence, the nature
of private international law lends itself more to uniform legislation than to international conventions as a method of unification,54 to private-law-like codification
48
49
50

51

52

53
54

55

56

57

Mansel, supra n 21, 103–11.
J Basedow, “Das Konventionsprivatrecht und das Völkerrecht der Staatsverträge”, ibid, 153.
See E Jayme, “Völkerrecht und Internationales Privatrecht – Eine entwicklungsgeschichtliche
Betrachtung”, in Leible and Ruffert, supra n 1, 23, 24–6; the resolution of the Institute is ibid,
39–40; see also, briefly, Basedow, supra n 49, 156–7.
See KH Nadelmann, “Multilateral Conventions in the Conflicts Field: An Historical Sketch”
(1972) 19 Netherlands International Law Review 107.
PS Mancini, “De l’utilité de rendre obligatoires pour tous les Etats, sous la forme de plusieurs
traités internationaux, un certain nombre de règles générales du Droit international prié pour
assurer la decision uniforme des conflits entre les différentes égislations civiles et criminelles”
Clunet 1 (1874), 221–39, 285–304.
Supra n 49.
K Nadelmann, “Uniform Legislation versus International Conventions as a Method of Unification of Private International Law”, in K Nadelmann, Conflict of Laws: International and Interstate:
Selected Essays (The Hague, Nijhoff 1972), 87.
See K Nadelmann, “Mancini’s Nationality Rule and Non-Unified Legal Systems” (1969) 17 American Journal of Comparative Law 418, 422–3. A prominent proponent of codification was none other
than David Dudley Field, famous for his promotion of codification of domestic law in New York.
See R Michaels, “The European Choice-of-Law Revolution” 82 Tulane Law Review II.A (forthcoming).
J Basedow, “Was wird aus der Haager Konferenz für Internationales Privtrecht?” in T Rauscher
and H-P Mansel (eds), Festschrift für Werner Lorenz zum 80. Geburtstag (München, Sellier, 2001), 463;
M Traest, “Development of a European Private International Law and the Hague Conference”
(2003) 5 Yearbook of Private International Law 223.
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(as had been proposed prior to Mancini).55 In Europe, uniform legislation is
replacing the traditional focus on Conventions;56 this is one of several reasons for
the crisis of the Hague Conference.57 A recent proposal to harmonise global
private international law through the development of a restatement of general
principles, similar in nature to the UNIDROIT Principles of International and
Commercial Contracts,58 displays a view of private international law as distinct
from public international law and treaties among sovereigns.
4. International Trade Law
Arguably, the biggest potential for public international law restraints on private
international law lies not in general public international law, but in trade law.
This is so under two aspects. A first aspect – the duty to treat different countries
alike or to grant most favoured-nation status – is addressed in this volume by
Peter Mankowski.59 Most-favoured-nation clauses are not specific to the World
Trade Organization (WTO) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
they exist also in treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation. Their immediate target is public regulation, but they may well be applicable to private
international law too. Their effect may be that specific rules of inter-European
private international law, based on the specific requirements of the Common
Market, must be extended to third countries. This is not idle speculation. When
the European Court of Justice decided, in its Centros trilogy of cases, that
Member States like Germany had to recognise corporations even when these
were established under a law other than that of their effective seat, it had in
mind only the protection of Member State corporations. However, the German
Federal Court of Justice decided that the same degree of recognition is owed to
US (especially Delaware) corporations under the US–German Friendship
Treaty.60
A second aspect concerns the question whether choice-of-law rules can be
viewed as discriminatory, directly or indirectly. These questions have become
prominent with regard to requirements of EU law,61 which is not covered here
because it is not viewed strictly as public international law. But such questions
might also arise under WTO law. For example, it has been argued that WTO law
58

59

60

61

H Kronke, “Most Significant Relationship, Governmental Interests, Cultural Identity, Integration: ‘Rules’ at Will and the Case for Principles of Conflict of Laws” (2004) 9 Uniform Law Review
467.
P Mankowski, “Völkerrechtliche Meistbegünstigung und europäisches IPR/IZVR” in Leible and
Ruffert, supra n 1, 235.
Bundesgerichtshof, 29 Jan 2003 VIII ZR 155/02, [2003] Neue Juristiche Wochenschrift 1607; JC
Dammann, “Amerikanische Gesellschaften mit Sitz in Deutschland. Zugleich eine Anmerkung zu
BGH 29.1.2003 – VIII ZR 155/02” (2004) 65 RabelsZ 1. Mankowski, supra n 59, 262 argues that
the result followed already from a choice of law rule in the US–German Treaty.
See J Meeusen, “Instrumentalisation of Private International Law in the European Union:
Towards a European Conflicts Revolution?” (2007) 9 European Journal of Migration and Law 287,
291ss; Michaels, supra n 56, II.3.b.
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requires a lex loci delicti rule to ensure that no discrimination between local and
foreign market participants ensues.62 The ultimate consequence of such arguments would be that the relevant market would provide the only permissible
connecting factor for rules of private international law.63 Although such extreme
developments seem unlikely at this stage, their consideration shows how the
centre of the debate has shifted. The development in globalisation away from
state sovereignty and towards markets is matched by the relevance of public
international law to private international law. State sovereignty, classical public
international law, has lost its importance. By contrast, market-related rules of
public international law have a potential impact on private international law that
is so far underappreciated.

C. P UBLIC I NTERNATIONAL L AW D UTY

TOWARDS

I NDIVIDUALS

The move from states to markets is also a move from states to individuals and
their rights. Public international law rules on rights can play a role in private
international law in two conceptions: the private law conception of acquired or
vested rights, and the broader conception of human rights. The first one has
long been more prominent; the second one is gaining ground.
1. Acquired Rights
Public international law has historically required countries to recognise rights,
especially property rights, acquired under foreign law. For some time, such an
idea was translated directly into private international law. The vested rights
theory, prominent for some time under legal systems as different as those of
France, England and the United States, provided the basis for private international law: courts were required to enforce rights acquired under a foreign law.
That theory is dead – “brutally murdered” in the United States,64 gently edited
out of later editions from the leading textbook in England.65 By then the theory
62

63

64

65

J Goldsmith and AO Sykes, “Lex Loci Delictus and Global Economic Welfare: Spinozzi v ITT
Sheraton Corp” (2007) 120 Harvard Law Review 1137, 1144–5. More generally on the potential impact
of WTO law on private international law, see W-H Roth, “Welthandelsordnung und IPR” (2003)
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conflict-of-laws system, see C Joerge, “Constitutionalism in Postnational Constellations: Contrasting Social Regulation in the EU and in the WTO”, in C Joerges and E-U Petersmann (eds),
Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade Governance and Social Regulation (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2006),
491.
For the market as relevant connecting factor, see D Martiny, “Die Anknüpfung an den Markt”, in
Festschrift für Ulrich Drobnig zum siebzigsten. Geburtstag (Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 1998), 389.
N de Belleville Katzenbach, “Conflicts on an Unruly Horse: Reciprocal Claims and Tolerances
in Interstate and International Law” (1956) 65 Yale Law Journal 1087, 1087.
See JC Morris (gen ed), Dicey’s Conflict of Laws (London, Stevens & Sons and Sweet & Maxwell,
6th edn, 1949) LXV; JC Morris (gen ed), Dicey’s Conflict of Laws (London, Stevens & Sons, 7th
edn, 1958), 9.
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had long been rejected in Germany by Wächter and Savigny.66 As a consequence, it never gained ground and is mentioned in this book merely in
passing.67
Narrowly understood, the theory no longer plays a role. However, as I have
argued elsewhere, it has been reborn in the European Union in the form of a
country-of-origin principle.68 The idea behind this principle is that a market
participant who complies with the rules of its home state thereby acquires, metaphorically speaking, a privilege (a “vested right”) that it can ask to be enforced
anywhere else where it does business. This is relevant in the European Union
(although, for the moment, a country-of-origin principle has been deleted from
the important services directive.) A European country-of-origin principle may
have to be extended to third-country domiciliaries as a consequence of
most-favoured-nation clauses, as Mankowski shows.69 Under general public
international law, a similar concept does not exist. A country-of-origin rule is
part, however, of certain specific conventions like the Berne Convention. Rules
of origin under WTO law play a different role; they define the country of origin,
but they do not defer to that country’s laws.
2. Human Rights
If the role of acquired rights in this area is thus limited, the role of innate rights
may be huge. This at least is the fascinating thesis of Erik Jayme. Jayme, in his
contribution on the history of public and private international law, avoids almost
all reference to the usual themes of comity. Instead, starting with Kant,70 he
views the most important link between public and private international law in
human rights as a basis of specifically private international law.71 Most importantly, human rights require states to recognise foreign citizens as humans. For a
long time, the relevant rights were those of citizenship and nationality, which
provided a link between public and private international law. More recently, as
he reports, supranational human rights have played a greater role. Jayme’s position is not uncontested; it is countered in Germany by that of Christian von Bar,
66
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Michaels, supra n 61; similarly Mansel, supra n 21, 114.
Mankowski, supra n 59, 258–60.
On Kant’s importance for private international law, see also K Siehr, “Kant and Private International Law” (2001) 2 European Business Organization Law Review 767. A Kantian reconceptualization
of private international law is the theme of F Rödl, “Weltbürgerliches Kollisionsrecht. Über die
Form des Kollisionsrechts und ihre Einlösung im Recht der Europäischen Union” (PhD Thesis
EUI Florence, 2008).
Jayme, supra n 50, 23. More extensively, E Jayme, Menschenrechte und Theorie des Internationalen
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who argues against human rights as foundation and limit of private international
law.72
What exactly is the role of human rights in private international law? Part of
their role is to provide the basis of a public policy exception against odious
foreign law, discussed in the contribution by Andreas Spickhoff.73 Spickhoff
rightly argues that it would be neither appropriate nor necessary to view the
exception itself as originating in international law.74 (Whether the situation is
different for European public policy is another matter.)75 Instead, because human
rights are integrated into domestic German law, they play an important role in
determining the content of the domestic public policy exception. Of course, this
leads to an ambiguous result regarding the relevance of public international law:
public international law plays a role only insofar as it represents domestic law,
and only as an exception to, and not a foundation of, the ordinary determination
and application of the applicable law.76
But human rights are not only an exception to the application of “normally”
applicable law, they can also become the basis for its determination. Jayme
briefly discusses how the European Court of Justice has invoked rules against
discrimination in the law of family names.77 This could eventually make it necessary to replace nationality as a connecting factor by habitual residence (and
would thereby create a late victory for Savigny over Mancini’s openly political
private international law). An even bigger role for human rights would emerge if
party autonomy could be based on them, as the International Law Institute held
in a 1991 resolution.78 Within the European Union, such ideas have already
gained some prominence.79
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It remains to be seen whether this would be asking too much of human rights.
But it is worth noting that this alleged rise in the importance of public international law actually represents a decline in its traditional role as law between
states. The abolition of nationality (as defined by states) and the constraints
towards state-based limitations on party determination of law reduce the impact
of public international law as a law between nations. The rise of human rights as
a basis of private international law suggests a rise of the private, at the cost of
the public. It is not clear that this concept of human rights is necessarily a public
one at all. (The same is true for citizenship. Karen Knop shows how the citizenship concept as used and established within private international law should be
viewed as a private form of citizenship.80) Today, the site of human rights is
usually sought in treaties between nations; this is what justifies their character as
public international law. But the historical notion of human rights as prior to
states suggests they are better placed beyond the distinction of public and private
– they are rights against states, but they also permeate private relations (as discussions on the UK Human Rights Act have made quite clear81). Ironically, the
increasing role of human rights in private international law restricts the freedom
of states at large, and therefore reduces the role of the international system of
states, and of traditional public international law, to private international law.
The more private international law focuses on the individual and his rights, the
less room remains for relations between states.

D. I NTERNATIONAL E CONOMIC L AW: A M ERGER
P UBLIC AND P RIVATE ?

OF

If there is one area in which it may appear obvious that public and private international law must merge, this is the area of economic law.82 On the one hand,
participants in global markets are subject to rules from both public and private
international law, so a full picture of the relevant law would have to address
both. On the other hand, states as market participants are increasingly subject to
rules of private rather than public international law, so the same merger seems
unavoidable. It is one of the most fascinating aspects of this book that it shows
up the problems with such a view.
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1. International Economic Law
In a central essay in this book, Klaus Schurig addresses the question of whether
there is methodological convergence or divergence between public and private
international law – especially, but not exclusively, in international economic law.83
His answer may be surprising to outsiders to the German discourse:84 Schurig
sees neither convergence nor divergence but complete separation. Public and
private international law concern different questions and use different methods.
International economic law is for him a conglomerate of very diverse rules – an
interesting field of study, but not a discipline. (Unfortunately, the parallel study in
this book by a public international lawyer, Albrecht Weber’s study on the tension
between markets and social welfare as goals of international economic law, does
not address this question and instead focuses only on public international law.85)
Schurig’s view (which is not unanimously shared in Germany) must be understood against a German background. Since the beginning of the last century, the
concepts of “economic law” and “international economic law” have often been
used to challenge the traditional German distinction between private and public
law and replace it with a functional differentiation of different legal systems.86 By
denying a separate sphere of private law, such attempts have usually been
coupled with a stronger emphasis on the regulatory aspects of law. Such an
understanding of law is very much in a accordance with US thinking about the
law,87 but does not chime so well, as Schurig makes clear, with traditional
German systematic thinking.88 Public international lawyers may be happy to
treat private international law as an annex to their own discipline. From a private
international law perspective, this does not do justice to the specific character of
choice-of-law rules.
As a former student of Schurig, I may be considered biased in his favour. But
it appears that a view that keeps private and public international law apart, for
analytical purposes, holds huge advantages. Only a separation enables us to
recognise the technical and methodological differences between private and
public international law. If indeed public and private international law work as
functional equivalents, this is all the more reason to keep them apart in the analysis to get a clearer understanding of how exactly the law deals with specific
problems, how public relates to private within the combined regulation.
83
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The attack on the distinction tends to confuse analytical separation with
substantive results, assuming that such a distinction by necessity implies a
stronger position for the private. This assumption is unwarranted, as can be
observed in another contribution to the book. Eberhard Eichenhofer asks
whether social standards that are based in public international law can be
protected better through private international law or through (public) unified
law.89 The question makes it clear that the tension between individual and
common interests is not the same as that between private and public international law: private international law may well protect common interests (or at
least the interests of the weaker party); public international law may be used to
protect individual interests. Unfortunately, Eichenhofer appears to assume that
private international law would be denatured if the designation of the applicable
law is based on protective interests instead of the closest connection. Under such
a view, his result – unified law is superior – is almost unavoidable. But modern
private international law has long acknowledged protection of weaker parties as
a legitimate goal, even within a Savignyan paradigm.
In addition, specific methods of conflict of laws have been developed for
social security law, as discussed briefly by Eichenhofer,90 and more generally for
administrative law, discussed in this book by Christoph Ohler.91 Ohler argues
that conflicts rules for administrative law (including the possibility of applying
foreign law) are necessarily different from those for private law (though they can
derive inspiration from the latter). His view that foreign public law poses special
problems is of course not confined to Germany,92 nor is it incorrect as such.
However, it seems that the essential difference between private international law
and international administrative law is overrated (just as, some 100 years ago, the
desire in Germany to establish substantive administrative law as essentially
different from substantive private law was not upheld for long). Ohler postulates
two relevant differences between both: first, private international law presumes
equivalence of legal orders (while international administrative law does not);
second, private international law assumes conflicts (while international administrative law frequently acts in situations with no conflicts). Both differences seem
exaggerated – equivalence of legal orders in the abstract way in which it underlies private international law is a postulate also of public international law;
89
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conflicts are no more defining of private international law than of other disciplines. This is not meant to minimise the differences that remain. But it seems
that a system of conflicts rules for administrative law is more similar to a
conflicts system for private law rules than it is similar to public international law.
In this sense, the development of conflicts rules for areas outside of private law
as a field signifies a rise of private international law as a method.
2. The State in the Economy
The distinction between public and private international law becomes especially
problematic where the state is involved as an actor in economic transactions.
While those transactions are structurally similar to those among private actors,
the state is at the same time protected and constrained by its role as a sovereign
subject.
Public international law accounts for this situation by confining certain
doctrines to situations where the state acts as a sovereign. Oliver Dörr analyses
one such doctrine, state immunity.93 After discussing the doctrine in public international law, he finds that private international law, especially the law of
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, can accommodate immunity
– either within a public policy exception, or, between EU Member States,
through limitations in the scope of application of the Brussels Regulation. This
much should be uncontroversial. The European Convention on State Immunity
goes even further and excludes, in its Article 23, all enforcement except where
the defendant state has consented to it. But the impression that state immunity
will usually trump private international law is in tension with the tendency,
described by Dörr, towards restricting state immunity – for commercial acts,94 for
liability for torture95 – and thereby reopening issues of private international law.
When the US Supreme Court decided, in its Altmann decision, that Austria could
not claim immunity against a claim to return five Klimt paintings expropriated
during the Nazi era to the descendants of the owner, state immunity was only
the first issue.96 The court did not touch on a number of difficult questions
regarding the applicable law, including the problem of whether defendant states
should be allowed to rely on their own rules of law in defending claims.97
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Choice-of-law issues must likewise result where redress is granted to torture
victims, since international law treaties do not themselves provide the necessary
details of such claims.
Problems of private international law are also lurking in the background of
the topic of sovereign state insolvency, discussed by Christian Tietje in this book
as problems involving public and private international law.98 Cases before
German courts involving Argentina show this mixture clearly. When Argentina
defaulted on its debts, it had waived its sovereign immunity and acceded to the
application of German law and the exclusive jurisdiction of courts in Frankfurt.
The cases that arose looked very much like ordinary private law cases in many
ways. The main remaining question – whether Argentina could invoke its own
moratorium and its financial situation against the claim – creates problems for
private and public international law. From a private international law perspective, the question was whether the Argentinian moratorium rules should become
applicable as “internationally mandatory rules”. From a public international law
perspective, the question was whether Argentina could rely on a state of necessity, perhaps based on Article 25 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility for
Wrongful Acts. Both alternatives are unsatisfactory, because they would not
enable debt restructuring as the most promising solution.
Tietje argues that issues like that of sovereign debt necessarily combine public
and private international law, and that insufficient attention has been paid to
arbitral awards in the area.99 However the solution he sees as most promising is
one of pure private international law: collective action clauses, terms in the
lending contracts in which creditors and debtor states agree on restructuring
procedures. This is a complex attempt to recreate, entirely on the basis of individual contracts, an insolvency procedure like that provided, domestically, by
states. The result is a situation that can be mastered entirely through private
international law: the respective contracts will be enforceable, and state interests
and state necessity are no longer relevant criteria in the analysis. Whether this is
desirable or not, in essence it looks like a clear victory of private over public
international law, and of private over public ordering.
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P RIVATE

This overview of themes and perspectives may be partial and unrepresentative.
Nonetheless, it should suffice to put into doubt the thesis that public international law is gaining ground over private international law. State interests in
public international law are becoming unimportant: general public international
law places hardly any constraints on private international law, comity as a basis
of private international law is no longer a public international law concept, and
treaties as a traditional means of choice-of-law unification are giving ground to
restatement approaches. Trade law has an impact, but its focus is on protecting
private actors’ right of access to markets, not state interests. Indeed, if individual
interests – human rights, citizenship – have a growing impact, it is doubtful
whether they are truly public concepts. International economic law is turning
towards private agreements and private international law, not public international law.
These developments suggest not only a shift in the hierarchy between the
individual and the state – a shift that public international law has long acknowledged and accommodated. They suggest also a shift away from the balancing of
interests that is typical of public international law towards the technical character of private international law. The restructuring of sovereign debt is perhaps
the clearest example for this development. General invocations of sovereignty
and of political interests with no clear definition are giving ground to exact and
rigid rules. In this sense, the thesis that public and private international law are
necessarily merging is not substantiated. Instead, private international law is
expanding its scope.
Private international law cannot remain unchanged in this process. If it is
supposed to master many more tasks than those assigned to it by Savigny, whose
thinking still permeates German discussions on private international law, it will
have to learn from public international law, if only because many of its new tasks
were formerly those of public international law. Many contributions in this book
show that such learning processes are going on. In the end, this learning experience may present the biggest influence of public on private international law.
That such a learning experience can be had from the book before us is its great
achievement.

